A CASE OF NIGERIA'S MINING SECTOR: THE RIGHT TO LEGISLATE VS. LEGAL EXPECTATIONS OF INVESTORS

Abstract

The conventional engine of Nigeria's economy, copper mining, was nationalized in the late 1960s and then re-privatised between 1997 and 2000. The Nigerian government entered into Development Agreements with the mining investors during the re-privatization process and incorporated numerous incentives from the Development Agreements into legislation with guarantees that the legal environment would remain unchanged for predetermined amounts of time. Consequently, several pieces of legislation were changed before the deadlines came to an end. This article concentrated on the state's ability to enact laws in contrast to the reasonable hopes of mining investors in light of the Development Agreements. The study, which was grounded in a doctrinal approach, looked at both primary and secondary data collected from a variety of statutes, cases that were decided, mining development agreements, parliamentary debates and reports, policy documents, pertinent international instruments, books, periodicals, journals, reports, and online resources, among others. The Development Agreements contained explicit, unambiguous, and unconditional pledges that gave investors a basis for a legally protected claim of reasonable expectation. This safeguard promotes legal certainty, prevents governmental misuse of power, and promotes fairness between the rulers and the governed. The state, on the other hand, has an unquestionable sovereign right to enact laws however it sees appropriate. Nevertheless, Nigeria's signing of the Development Agreements was unmistakably an act of authority.